Children and Megadisasters: Lessons Learned in the New Millennium by Garrett, Andrew L. et al.
Advances in Pediatrics 54 (2007) 189–214
ADVANCES IN PEDIATRICSChildren and Megadisasters: Lessons
Learned in the New Millennium
Andrew L. Garrett, MD, MPHa,*, Roy Grant, MAb,
Paula Madrid, PsyDa, Arturo Brito, MD, MPHb,
David Abramson, PhD, MPHa, Irwin Redlener, MDa
aNational Center for Disaster Preparedness, Columbia University, Mailman School of Public
Health, 722 W. 168th St., New York, NY 10023, USA
bChildren’s Health Fund, 215 West 125th Street, Suite 301, New York, NY 10027, USA
T
he term megadisaster has worked its way into the mainstream since the
start of the new millennium. The expression once reserved for the techni-
cal meaning of the word—a ‘‘one in a million’’ disaster—has recently been
brought to the forefront by several large natural events that have occurred in
the past 5 years, namely Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the Indian
Ocean tsunami of 2004. These two disasters, as well as the terrorist attacks
of September 2001 in the United States have directed a persistent spotlight
on the systems by which the public and its government plan for, respond to,
and recover from high-impact catastrophes.
From the beginnings of human society, both nature and our own species
have found ways to traumatically disrupt the status quo. Despite the many ca-
tastrophes in our history, the term disaster has been difficult to define. Most def-
initions include some reference to the event’s impact on people, the economy,
or the environment. More theoretically, a disaster can be seen as a complex
function of risk and vulnerability. As an example, the magnitude of a hurricane
disaster is not as simple as the force of the hurricane itself upon a community
but rather a sum of those forces (eg, storm-force winds) plus the special vulner-
abilities faced by the community (eg, levee failure) plus the community’s capac-
ity to reduce the actual or potential negative consequences of risk (eg, an
inability to evacuate citizens). It is complicated interplay among the forces of
destruction and the broad ability (or inability) of a community, for myriad rea-
sons, to withstand them and mitigate their impact.
There is ranging opinion and there has been much discussion about the prac-
tical definition of disaster, much of it dependent upon the context in which the
term is being analyzed. Many academics feel that for an incident to be techni-
cally classified as a disaster, it must overwhelm the day-to-day routine enough
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of their normal support structure for assistance that would normally come from
within their own community. The layperson, however, has a less restrictive
definition and typically describes a disaster as any incident that causes a signif-
icant loss of life or property damage. Although there is clearly a continuum be-
tween a crisis, a disaster, and a megadisaster, experts disagree as to where the
demarcations lie, and the basis for making these distinctions. The situations dis-
cussed in this article are clearly at the megadisaster end of this spectrum and,
for our purposes, they meet the criteria discussed in Redlener’s book on the
subject: an emergency that overwhelms local and regional response capacity
and includes such factors as an inability to manage rescue and medical needs,
a failure to protect vital infrastructure, and a degree of uncontrolled societal
breakdown [1].
Hurricane Katrina is America’s most recent encounter with a megadisaster.
But what made it a megadisaster instead of just another category 3 hurricane of
the type that seasonally exists in the Gulf of Mexico? Katrina was not the larg-
est or strongest hurricane to strike the United States mainland in the recent
past, but its effects were devastating and wide reaching beyond our wildest
nightmares, far beyond those of Hurricane Andrew (1992), a category 5 hurri-
cane that scoured much of Florida and the Gulf Coast. Hurricane Katrina’s
track directly targeted gaping vulnerabilities in infrastructure and society,
and set in motion a series of events that culminated in the deaths of nearly
2000 people, resulted in hundreds of missing individuals, and caused a potential
economic impact of up to $150 billion. The disruption of people’s lives was im-
measurable, as was the impact on the long-term physical and mental health of
the victims, which continues today. Katrina also led to a substantial decline in
the confidence that the public has in its government to provide essential ser-
vices during a disaster.
The year 2001 was a terrible beginning to a millennium that had transitioned
uneventfully. Having just dodged the ‘‘Y2K’’ bullet, which many feared would
unravel the fabric of society, most Americans went about their lives completely
unaware of their susceptibility to terrorism. The nation suddenly entered a new
era of vulnerability and fear as thousands died in New York City, Washington,
D.C., and Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at the hands of extreme jihadists. Shortly
thereafter, a handful of letters tainted with anthrax ushered in the first wide-
spread biological attack that the nation had experienced. Despite the low casu-
alty count, the letters led to a massive disruption of the US Postal Service
infrastructure and cost hundreds of millions of dollars to remediate. After ex-
tensive investigation, the crime remains unsolved, leaving many to wonder if
it could happen again. These events had wide-reaching aftershocks as the na-
tion returned to war and scrambled to improve the nation’s disaster and terror-
ism detection, response, and recovery infrastructure at an unprecedented cost
to the public. The megadisaster of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States continues to claim casualties and astronomical costs 6 years later and
has affected every person in the United States in one way or another.
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tastrophes such as these strike because of their dependent nature as well as their
physiologic and psychological vulnerability. Children affected by Katrina were
no exception. Persistent critical gaps exist in the ability to prepare for and re-
spond to the needs of the youngest victims. These were clearly exposed as chil-
dren endured an at times ineffectual disaster response followed by a stressful
recovery that is still ongoing. An analysis of the issues that faced children dur-
ing this event and some others from the recent past may help society reduce the
impact of such disasters on children in the future. This article focuses on a few
of the major shortfalls in the care of children that have become especially ap-
parent in the last few years:
Facilitating evacuation
Providing shelter
Caring for those with special medical needs
Addressing mental health needs
These scenarios are not new. Historical accounts of the aftermath of the 1906
San Francisco Earthquake depict a scene that mirrors that following Hurricane
Katrina—with widespread suffering; overworked and overwhelmed public ser-
vices, such as law enforcement and hospital care; and inadequate public relief
in the form of food, water, and shelter. As some who have studied this mega-
disaster observed, ‘‘society’s ability to respond to major disasters seems to have
progressed little in the century’’ [2].
Future disasters will predictably overwhelm the public and those who work to
maintain health, safety, and lawfulness in society. No amount of prevention and
mitigation will ever fully eliminate the burden of large-scale disasters. That said, it
is entirely realistic to set achievable goals that may significantly reduce prevent-
able suffering and ensure equity for all affected individuals preparing for, re-
sponding to, and recovering from a disaster. These goals are best accomplished
by learning from past experiences, both distant and recent, studying new pre-
paredness and response strategies, and taking purposeful action when indicated.
CRITICAL RESPONSE AND RECOVERY ISSUES
Evacuation
During and after Hurricane Katrina, children were especially vulnerable to
harm from the disorderly evacuation and chaos that followed in New Orleans
after the levees broke and the city flooded. Estimates are that 80% of the pop-
ulation of the city relocated ahead of the storm, with approximately 25,000
using a ‘‘refuge of last resort,’’ the city’s Louisiana Superdome [3]. Many
rode the storm out in their homes. With an immense population on the
move and the remainder in areas with conditions that would quickly deterio-
rate, many of the children involved in the evacuation soon faced struggles
that would range from a shortage of shelter, food, water, and chronic medical
care to an imminent threat to their lives as their homes were overtaken by
floodwaters. Heroic efforts by the military, the US Coast Guard, authorities,
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have perished. Local, state, and federal officials, as well as volunteers, worked
tirelessly but haphazardly to provide rescue and relief under oppressive condi-
tions. Many children were removed from harm’s way and delivered to shelters
or evacuation waystations, such as the city’s Louis Armstrong Airport, with
few initial physical casualties. During the first days of the storm and the subse-
quent evacuations, nearly 5000 children were reported missing. Eventually,
nearly all of the children were reunited with their caregivers. In some cases,
however, this process took up to 2 months. Many children endured frightening
experiences. One third of surveyed fourth to twelfth graders in the region re-
ported that they were separated from their caregivers during or after the storm.
An additional one third reported being separated from a family pet. One in five
reported an injury to a family member, and 15% said that a family member had
died [4].
Just a few weeks after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, Hurricane
Rita threatened the Gulf Coast. The hurricane’s path would likely bring the
storm through Houston. Motivated by fears of another Katrina-like catastro-
phe, 2.5 million people evacuated the region. Ninety of the 111 storm-related
deaths in this instance were due to the evacuation process itself as gridlock
on the highway and oppressive heat took its toll on the chronically ill and el-
derly. Several complicated issues emerged as factors affecting the process of
evacuation.
Barriers to preparedness
A national survey conducted in 2006 by the National Center for Disaster Pre-
paredness demonstrated that only a minority of the American public is person-
ally prepared for a disaster [5]. Less than one third (31%) have made basic
family emergency preparations, which means planning on a meeting place
and having at hand at least a 2-day supply of food and water, a flashlight, a por-
table radio, spare batteries, and emergency phone numbers. In terms of atti-
tude, two-thirds (66%) feel personally unprepared. These figures are virtually
unchanged from 2005 (31% and 64%, respectively).
During and after Hurricane Katrina, some children were unavoidably sepa-
rated from families during the rescue process, and others may not have been
with their families when the storm made further travel impossible. Still, a gen-
eral lack of disaster preparedness by individuals and families likely contributed
to the large initial number of missing children. Without a mechanism for all
members of a family to reconnect, such as via an out-of-area contact, it can
take days, weeks, or longer for such agencies as the American Red Cross
and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children to reconnect sep-
arated people. Asked why they do not have a family emergency preparedness
plan, a quarter of those surveyed (26%) say they have not had enough time to
assemble these items with nearly another quarter (22%) saying they do not
know what to do to achieve basic preparedness. Only 3% report that they al-
ready feel prepared. The percentages for these reasons are virtually unchanged
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well-intended efforts by government emergency officials and employers, risk
communication has failed to convince the American public that family disaster
preparedness is essential.
A community evacuation plan that engages all citizens and accounts for their
needs is an essential element of community preparedness. As was made appar-
ent in New Orleans, the government must direct and facilitate the movement of
individuals out of harm’s way to the extent possible. However, the cooperation
of those citizens who would be required to evacuate is also crucial. Moving peo-
ple to safety in an orderly fashion during an emergency has been and can be
expected to continue to be problematic. Lack of personal or public transporta-
tion and concerns about the welfare of dependents are daunting barriers to ef-
fective community evacuation, as was demonstrated in New Orleans. Surveys
reveal that 29% of respondents cite lack of access to transportation as a reason
that they would be unable to evacuate when ordered to by authorities, a figure
virtually identical to responses in 2005 (30%). An overwhelming 92% of Amer-
icans have at least one reason why they would not evacuate immediately if or-
dered to do so. This is unchanged since 2005. The most common reasons cited
are the need to ensure the safety of dependent family members—children (48%),
elderly (47%), disabled (45%), and pets (34%) [5].
The same study also indicates a low level of confidence in the government to
be able to provide essential disaster services to the community. After Hurricane
Katrina, fewer than half of the residents in the Gulf Region are confident in the
ability of government to respond appropriately to a natural disaster (47%). In
2006, only half of those questioned in a national poll felt that their government
had adequate plans in place to respond to a natural disaster. This was un-
changed from 2005, pre-Katrina. The number of those who said they would
resist a mandatory evacuation order increased in 2006 to 42%, up from 36%
the year before [5]. These data suggest that there is a critical shortfall in the en-
gagement of individuals and families to become partners with government
agencies that are supposed to protect them, and vice versa. As seen in New Or-
leans during Hurricane Katrina, a disconnect between emergency messaging
by authorities and public response likely contributed to poor decision-making
by many in the community as the threat from the storm increased and time ran
out to evacuate. This led to a drastically unstable scenario that risked the lives
of tens of thousands of victims, and generated an immense demand on the gov-
ernment to conduct dangerous, costly, and labor-intensive rescue and relief op-
erations. The challenging logistics of evacuating a family with children, elderly
family members, and pets during a disaster suggest that planning has an impor-
tant role, as does ensuring that all members of the community have access to
a means to evacuate when ordered to do so.
An unengaged and unprepared population is at a disadvantage when disaster
strikes. It is valuable to explore the different experience that the island nation of
Cuba has had with respect to risk communications, public preparedness, and
disaster-related morbidity and mortality, for there are likely practices and
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frequency of hurricanes that seasonally threaten Cuba are similar to those that
affect the southeastern United States. What are very different are the outcomes
that Cuba has been able to attain. For Hurricane Ivan, nearly 2 million were
evacuated with no fatalities compared with 39 in Grenada, 25 in the United
States, 17 in Jamaica, 4 in the Dominican Republic, 3 in Venezuela, 2 in the
Cayman Islands, and 1 each in Tobago and Barbados [6,7]. Cuba has drasti-
cally reduced the number of storm-related deaths and injuries over the last
few decades by promoting a system of citizen preparedness and involvement
that starts in elementary school and includes mandatory civil defense training
for adults. Furthermore, it has been done without a vast expenditure of funds.
Children understand the basic concept of risk from hurricanes at an early age,
and use this as a foundation for learning such skills as first aid and storm pre-
paredness. Annual government-sponsored nationwide hurricane drills provide
all citizens with the opportunity to test their family and community emergency
plans before there is a crisis, and there is near complete buy-in to the benefits of
this preparation.
There is also widespread cooperation among the population, the Cuban Red
Cross, the civil defense authorities, the military, the government, and the
broadcast media. When a hurricane does threaten, the citizens become ex-
tremely engaged in the potential threat and follow the storm’s progress closely
by television and radio. When authorities order an evacuation, it is undertaken
promptly, efficiently, and decisively, with communities ensuring that those who
need special assistance receive it. Because the actions of the community are re-
hearsed annually and are familiar, it is possible to efficiently evacuate and shel-
ter many hundreds of thousands of citizens in short order when necessary.
Although it would be naı¨ve to think that the practices of a socialist society could
be directly translated into a system that could operate well in the United States,
the concept of engaging the public and practicing emergency procedures is an
effective, but hardly a foreign, one. Indeed it is a system that has worked well
for fire safety for generations in the United States. The ubiquitous fire drill at
school, work, and home emphasizes that a behavior that is practiced is a behav-
ior more likely to be used in a crisis. Box 1 lists guidelines in planning for a di-
saster and evacuation.
Decision-making
The issue of communicating risk and influencing public action is complex.
Many who stayed behind in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina may
have felt that their lives, pets, and property would be better served by
remaining at home rather than evacuating. Others certainly felt that the
threat was not severe enough to merit the inconvenience, expense, and inher-
ent risk of taking part in a mass evacuation. Still others may have felt that
they had no place to go, and did not feel safe moving into a shelter. The
track of a hurricane is difficult to predict at the time when the evacuation
of a region needs to begin, typically 30 to 50 hours or more before the onset
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had years or decades of experience with ‘‘false alarm’’ warnings and evacua-
tions, and a subsequent perception of low individual vulnerability to the ef-
fects of a storm. Despite unprecented warnings from the National Weather
Service and the mayor prior to Hurricane Katrina, many still chose or
were forced to stay behind when an evacuation order was issued for the
city of New Orleans. There was overdependence by the city on an outdated
emergency plan and an overreliance on the anticipated use of personal vehi-
cles for evacuation when nearly 1 in 10 citizens did not have access to one.
As a result, some individuals were not physically capable of evacuating in
their own vehicles and the city could not make up for this incapacity with
public transportation. Similarly, during Hurricane Rita, authorities underesti-
mated the volume of vehicle traffic during the evacuation of the Houston
area, resulting in massive congestion and fuel shortages. In Katrina, some
state and federal assets were not called upon in a timely manner, and persis-
tent bureaucracy was a steep barrier to many of the out-of-state personnel
who wanted to assist. Box 2 lists guidelines related to disaster preparations
and decision-making.
Box 1: Lessons learned: planning for disaster and evacuation
Ensure that all family members know of an out-of-area contact they can call.
Teach children their phone numbers and address as early as possible.
Provide children with an emergency contact information card and have them
keep it with them at all times.
Put together a supply kit of practical emergency equipment that may be needed in
a disaster, and remember that it may need to be portable. Essentials include
water, food, shelter, and essential medications. Include a recent photo of
your children.
Discuss an emergency plan with all members of the family before there is an emer-
gency. This plan should include actions for family members if they not at home
when an emergency occurs.
Practice your emergency plan regularly. How will your family stay warm, find wa-
ter, stay safe, and obtain emergency information during a variety of
emergencies?
Promote and enable a culture of preparedness. Countries with mandatory, routine
community disaster drills are capable of responding to disasters with fewer in-
juries and fatalities because people are familiar what they are supposed to do.
Remember that routine emergency services, such as 911, likely will not be avail-
able during a disaster.
If an evacuation becomes necessary, consider writing essential information about
your child on his or her arm with a permanent marker in case you become
separated.
Include family pets in emergency planning. They may not be able to accompany
the family during evacuation or be allowed in shelters.
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The mass movement of hundreds of thousands of hurricane victims before,
during, and after Katrina placed an enormous burden upon the survivors
as well as the agencies and private individuals who assisted with sheltering.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reported nearly
200,000 adults and children were in public shelters, with an unknown num-
ber staying in motels, camping, or living with others. The quantity of storm-
related ‘‘internally displaced persons’’ who are still living away from their
previous home on the Gulf Coast has been cited at 1 million or more
[8,9]. As mentioned above, an estimated 25,000 persons sheltered initially
at the Louisiana Superdome, with up to 20,000 at the nearby New Orleans
Convention Center. This situation was partially a result of the inability of
the city to coordinate public transportation out of the area for those who
did not have a vehicle. While there is no information about the number of
children who sheltered in both the Superdome and the Convention Center,
the number can be estimated from a survey of those survivors who were
in the Houston Astrodome. Many were initially sheltered at the Superdome
or the Convention Center. One third of the adults surveyed report having
a child with them, which would suggest a minimum of approximately
15,000 children between the two refuges of last resort in New Orleans [10].
Children in the shelter environment pose special challenges because of their
typically curious and active behavior. These challenges can include those re-
lated to safety and security, hygiene, health maintenance, and disease
prevention.
Box 2: Lessons learned: guidelines for being well prepared and
making good decisions
Individuals and their families have a duty to make responsible decisions, using the
best information available. Children are dependent upon the good decision-
making of their caregivers and should be subjected to the lowest amount of
risk possible.
Consistently honest communication with the public regarding projected risk is
likely a useful approach in the long term.
Risk assessment is a vital part of emergency preparedness at the personal and
governmental level, and it should guide the development of response and re-
covery plans.
Families and communities should engage their local governments to share impor-
tant disaster preparedness information.
Communities can play an active role in promoting their own readiness for emer-
gencies through volunteerism, role modeling, and activism.
Children should be encouraged to be active participants in their family disaster
planning and know their roles during an emergency. Practice with children es-
sential basic lifesaving skills, such as home fire safety, first aid, and water
safety, and review specifics of the family disaster plan.
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quently, items such as personal medications, personal hygiene supplies, and ad-
equate food, water, and clothing are left behind. Hurricane Katrina was no
exception, and many children arriving at shelters found themselves in an envi-
ronment that could not support them with adequate water, nutrition, diapers,
formula, or prescription medications, especially at first. As a result, it was not
uncommon for hygiene conditions to rapidly deteriorate—a situation made
worse by ineffective or nonexistent hand-washing facilities. Children are an im-
portant variable with regards to the spread of disease in a large communal liv-
ing environment, such as a shelter. Because of their hand-to-mouth activity and
close contact with other people and objects, it is thought that children are at
a higher risk of acquiring respiratory and gastrointestinal diseases under these
conditions. Additionally, because of their mobile and social nature, children are
probably more efficient than adults at spreading certain diseases in this environ-
ment, which is similar to that of a shelter, such as a school or daycare cen-
ter, where children will naturally congregate. Several shelters, including the
massive Houston Astrodome, were affected by outbreaks of gastrointestinal
disease, including Norovirus and presumed dysentery, although it is yet
unclear the specific role that children played in these particular outbreaks,
if any.
For a number of reasons, many emergency shelters are inherently unsafe
or poor environments for children. For instance, there is no assurance of
childproofing of medications and dangerous items that may be accessible.
The supervision of children in this situation can be difficult at best. At the
Louisiana Superdome, widespread rumors of child assault and rape con-
tributed to a climate of fear, vulnerability, and stress. In some cases, pets
were admitted to shelters because they accompanied the owners during
evacuation, posing an additional risk. The stress of sudden dislocation, danger,
and disorientation can be extremely challenging for children and their
families.
Infants and children are more vulnerable to an interruption in the availability
of essential supplies, such as water and nutrition. Problems facing those who
were evacuated from New Orleans included a shortage of infant formula
and bottles to deliver it. There was great concern about the need to maintain
health prevention in the pediatric shelter population after the storm. Shelter
managers and medical personnel were concerned about an inability to deliver
important treatments, such as tetanus prophylaxis and antibiotics for those in-
jured or exposed to flood water. There were also concerns about potential ep-
idemics of childhood diseases, such as measles, pertussis, and chicken pox, as
well as hepatitis A for those exposed to floodwaters.
As with planning for evacuation, planning for shelter is an essential compo-
nent in the continuum of disaster preparedness. As discussed above, an over-
reliance on authorities or the American Red Cross (a nongovernmental
agency responsible for coordinating mass care services) to completely provide
for the essentials of food, water, shelter, and family emergency needs, such as
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involves assisting those who have not prepared adequately to evacuate. If
and when first aid stations are set up at a shelter, the top complaint is typically
forgotten medications, an issue that can be time-consuming, if not impossible,
to resolve. Forgotten or lost eyeglasses or contacts is the fourth most common
chief medical complaint of evacuees, after physical complaints for gastrointes-
tinal or respiratory symptoms.
From the provider standpoint, the experience with Hurricane Katrina re-
vealed a gross underestimate of the basic needs of the sheltered population, es-
pecially in the initial stages of the response. In some cases, there were extensive
specialized emergency supplies but a drastic shortage of the basics that are im-
portant for caring for children, such as formula, diapers, baby wipes, soap, and
hand sanitizer. Compounding this situation, the resupply of these consumable
items was at times impossible because of a host of logistical barriers. Another
issue was the custody and care of children who were lost or unattended.
Box 3 lists issues to keep in mind regarding shelter during a disaster.
Children with chronic and special health care needs
The care of children with special health care needs (CSHCN) during disasters
is a topic that has come to the forefront after Katrina. Inasmuch as children are
an underrepresented minority when it comes to disaster preparedness,
CSHCN suffered even more disproportionately during the mass evacuations
in the Gulf Coast. Because they depend on dedicated medical equipment, spe-
cialized medications, or their ‘‘medical home’’ of providers and specialists, chil-
dren and adults with chronic health care needs can be especially vulnerable if
preparations for disaster are inadequate.
Box 3: Lessons learned: issues to keep in mind regarding shelter
Do not assume that an emergency shelter will provide food, water, medication or
eyeglass replacement, and hygiene items. These should be part of a family’s
emergency supplies and brought along during evacuation and sheltering.
Children play a unique role in the shelter environment with their ability to both
spread and contract diseases, and proper hand-washing may not be possible.
Waterless hand sanitizer may be a valuable item to bring along.
The shelter environment can be a dangerous place for children. They need to be
closely supervised.
Children may be difficult to supervise in a shelter. Consider bringing something to
keep them occupied.
Shelter managers should have a plan to reestablish pediatric health care as soon
as possible, with a focus on screening for disease and ensuring that post-
disaster immunizations can be delivered if needed.
Shelter managers in their planning should recognize the high demand for infant-
care supplies, such as baby formula and diapers.
199CHILDREN AND MEGADISASTERSThe prevalence and distribution of CSHCN is larger than one might expect,
which recently led to disaster planning oversights that had serious repercus-
sions. Approximately 13% of children are identified as CSHCN. The number
of families who self-identify as having a family member who is CSHCN is 20%
[11]. There is little variability across socio-economic descriptors. As medical
technology and home care becomes more advanced, an increasing number
of CSHCN who previously lived at a specialized care facility are now in the
home.
The conditions that define a child as a CSHCN include, in the order of prev-
alence, (1) a need for specialized prescription medications (75%); (2) a need for
increased medical care (46%); (3) a need for emotional, behavioral, or develop-
mental services (29%); (4) a limitation of activities (21%); and (5) a requirement
for specialized therapies (17%) [11]. More than one of these descriptors may
apply to many CSHCN. Each of these categories presents a unique vulnerabil-
ity to the child required to break routine and undergo evacuation or emergency
sheltering.
Separation from specialized equipment
The type of equipment that a CSHCN may depend on ranges from the as-
sistive (motorized wheelchair) to the life-sustaining (home ventilator). In the
inevitable crowded rush to evacuate before, during, and after a disaster, it is
not uncommon for the decision to be made to separate a patient from his or
her equipment due to time or space considerations. As New Orleans was
evacuated during Katrina, devices that were not life-sustaining were often
left behind under the assumption that a substitute could be acquired at
the patient’s ultimate destination. At the Louis Armstrong Airport medical
waystation outside of New Orleans, evacuating survivors with nonacute
medical needs were categorized as either able to walk to a commercial air-
craft, or they were placed on military stretchers or in a wheelchair to await
specialized military medical evacuation. Few accommodations were made for
durable medical equipment that was not small and portable. There were
limited options for those who required specialized medicines that were not
in the government stockpile of basic pharmaceuticals, and options quickly
ran out for patients who needed dialysis in the short term. In addition to
the impact on health and life, this posed an unimaginable inconvenience
to the patient, for whom the specialized equipment was a part of their iden-
tity as much as a technical means for them to care for themselves once they
arrived at a shelter.
Separation from specialized care
Evacuation places a special burden on those who frequently visit clinics, rely on
home nursing services, or otherwise depend on outside resources. Such re-
sources are likely unavailable or reduced during a disaster, whether an evacu-
ation occurs or not. Without adequate planning, the conditions of patients who
are medically complicated are at an extreme risk of deteriorating if disaster has
an impact on daily routine or if there is a loss of essential services, such as
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not have any specialized medical supplies or staffing with the knowledge to
properly care for a complicated CSHCN. There will likely be limited accom-
modations for those with sensory impairment.
As a result, specialized medical shelters have been developed in some areas to
address the care needs of both children and adults with special health care re-
quirements. These may be separate facilities or they may exist within a large
general shelter for the public. With adequate planning and enough lead time,
it may also be possible to relocate a CSHCN directly to a medical facility outside
the affected region. Proper identification of the systems that will be expected to
relocate and care for a CSHCN is a vital part of preparedness that must be done
ahead of time. The child’s ‘‘medical home’’ caregiver has a special responsibility
to incorporate disaster planning into the overall care plan for the CSHCN.
When a CSHCN is relocated away from his or her medical home, the child
may pose an extreme diagnostic challenge to medical providers, who may well
be overwhelmed with medical responsibilities and who may not be pediatric
specialists. Regardless of the diagnosis, it is helpful for a family emergency
kit to contain an updated copy of an emergency information form for a patient
with special health care needs (Appendix A). This document is created by the
caregiver who knows the patient best, and it will provide invaluable guidance
to reestablishing routine or emergency medical care in another location. If spe-
cial medications are an important part of the child’s routine, this must be ac-
counted for during disaster planning. Medications that require refrigeration
and frequent resupply will pose a special, but not insurmountable, challenge.
In some cases, such as Hurricane Katrina, the impact of the storm upon the
health care facilities destroyed the permanent medical records of many patients,
some of whom were complicated CSHCN. This has the potential to set back the
care of the child greatly. In addition to the emergency form, it is important to dis-
cuss with the child’s primary care provider how this information is backed up. It
may be worthwhile to have a redundant copy stored in a safe location at home.
From the perspective of a health care system, it is vital for future operation to
be able to re-create any data that is destroyed during a disaster. Having electronic
medical records that are backed up at multiple locations is a valuable concept and
in all parties’ best interests. Box 4 lists issues and concerns related to accommo-
dating children with special health care needs during a disaster.
Mental health response
The scope of pediatric mental health disorders after disaster
There is extensive literature on the psychological impact of disasters on both
children and adults. This literature covers a wide range of events, such as
natural and technologic disasters. This section reviews some of the findings de-
scribing the psychological impact of disasters, both natural and human-caused
on children. With this as background, the authors present new data gathered
by the Children’s Health Fund and the National Center for Disaster Prepared-
ness on the mental health consequences of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
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sive damage and forced relocation of families in Louisiana and Mississippi after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and the flooding in New Orleans subsequent to
the breach of the levies there.
Analyses of the responses to past disasters demonstrate that psychological re-
actions in children do not necessarily follow a routine pattern or match the pre-
sentation of a similar condition in an adult. They can be delayed, complex, and
long-lasting. For example, focusing on natural disaster in the United States,
Shaw and colleagues [12] found that 70% of the school-age children reevaluated
21 months after exposure to Hurricane Andrew continued to exhibit moderate
to severe posttraumatic stress symptoms. Two years after a dam break and
flood, approximately 37% of the exposed children and adolescents still had
a probable diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) [13]. Outpatient
mental health use increased to a statistically significant degree in the first year
after Hurricane Floyd made landfall in North Carolina in 1999 [14]. A failure
to provide mental health interventions following exposure to the 1988 Spitak
earthquake in Armenia was associated with PTSD and depression in exposed
and untreated adolescents [15]. Conversely, school-based mental health screen-
ing and targeted psychosocial intervention proved effective in identifying chil-
dren with posttraumatic stress reactions and reducing their severity and impact
following Hurricane Iniki in 1992 [16].
Box 4: Lessons learned: accommodating children with special
health care needs
The prevalence of children with special health care needs is approximately one in
eight.
The prevalence of households who self-define as having a CSHCN is one in five.
A range of conditions may lead to a definition of CSHCN. These include a depen-
dence upon prescription pharmaceuticals, a need for an increased level of
care, the need for emotional or behavioral services, a limitation of activities,
and a requirement for special therapies.
The separation of medical or adaptive equipment from a dependent patient has
significant repercussions and should be avoided wherever possible.
Most shelters will not have the capacity to care for complex CSHCN.
Some specialized medical shelters have been established and may be freestand-
ing or integrated into existing general shelters
Medical information sharing is essential when a child is removed from his or her
medical home. The use of an emergency medical information form should be
encouraged to optimize the care of the child by unfamiliar providers.
The loss of medical records in a disaster can have a significant impact upon both
patients and the provider. Establishing redundant copies is advisable.
Planning ahead for the disaster-time care of a CSHCN is vital. The child’s primary
care provider should be actively involved in developing a preparedness plan
for the child and his or her family.
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emerged as risk factors for protracted child psychological reactions. McFarlane
[17] found that 26 months after exposure to an Australian wildland fire, one
third of the children studied continued to present significant posttraumatic
stress symptoms. It was reported that separation from parents in the immediate
aftermath of the fire, maternal preoccupation with disaster, and the altered fam-
ily dynamics were more important determinants of continuing symptomatol-
ogy than the child’s degree of first-hand exposure to the threat. These
findings foreshadow some of the risks associated with the mass evacuation
and relocation of children and families following Hurricane Katrina.
A substantial body of literature describes the mental health impact on
children of the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
in Oklahoma City. Investigators found that more than 40% of regional mid-
dle and high school students knew someone who had been injured and
more than one third knew someone who had died in the explosion. Besides
the widespread first-degree contact with loss around the event, PTSD symp-
toms were associated with both direct exposure and with watching television
reports of the bombing. Two thirds (67%) reported worrying about their
own and their family’s safety [18]. These studies explore the role that
mass media likely plays in the development of posttraumatic stress symp-
toms. Symptoms being manifested in locales geographically distant from
the bombing are likely due to this effect [19–22]. Based on the Oklahoma
City experience, it was recommended that child and adolescent television
viewing of terrorist events be monitored and restricted, but this has proven
difficult.
Child reactions to two megadisasters: September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina
Ample experience from prior events could have predicted the widespread and
long-standing impact that the terror attacks of 9/11 and the flooding and evac-
uation following the landfall of Hurricane Katrina had and are continuing to
exert upon children.
New York City, September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The Children’s Health Fund
and National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University, work-
ing with Marist College Institute for Public Opinion, developed and imple-
mented surveys of child and family reactions to the events of 9/11
throughout 2002 and 2003, with representative New York City and national
samples consistent with US Census Bureau data. Psychological reactions of
New York City children were ascertained by interviewing parents about new
concerns and new symptoms. It was immediately appreciated that in the first
year after 9/11, reactions were geographically dispersed throughout New
York City rather than concentrated or confined to those directly impacted;
there was no psychological ground zero. The most pervasive reactions were
concern about safety and fear of another attack, at 45% and 42% respectively
1 year after 9/11. The most stable symptomatic reaction was somatic com-
plaints (headache, stomachache), reported by 15% of parents 3 weeks after
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year and the same percentage 2 years post-9/11. This finding has implications
for pediatricians and other health care providers, since these ‘‘subclinical’’
physical complaints may be indicative of posttraumatic stress reactions. De-
tailed results are included Table 1.
As an indicator of the need for mental health assessment and intervention,
positive responses on these surveys were aggregated for children reported to
have had four or more concerns or symptoms. Three weeks after 9/11, 36%
of children reported multiple psychological reactions, declining only to 34%
at 6 months and 29% at 1 year. Two years after the attacks, this figure had
only declined to 23%, nearly one in four New York City children still exhibit-
ing multiple reactions. These data suggest that posttraumatic stress reactions
are likely to be protracted, at least without appropriate intervention. A review
of the geographic distribution of children with multiple concerns and symp-
toms reveals that the highest rates were in the boroughs with the lowest in-
come and highest proportion of racial–ethnic minority diversity with 32% in
the Bronx and 31% in Brooklyn affected. This is in contrast to the 26% rate
among children residing in Manhattan, which was the wealthiest borough
and the location of the World Trade Center, where the attack took place.
In the iteration of the survey 2 years after 9/11, questions regarding parental
reactions to the terrorist attacks and prior exposures to trauma within the fam-
ily were added. Child reactions were analyzed for associations with parent re-
actions and prior stressors, and a positive correlation was apparent. Children
with at least one post-9/11 concern were significantly more likely to have par-
ents with at least one post-9/11 symptom. Fifty-two percent of children with
multiple concerns and symptoms had a parent who reported being more impa-
tient and irritable compared with 8% of children with no reactions and 16%
with one to three reactions. Sixty-two percent of children with four or more
Table 1




























204 GARRETT ET ALconcerns and symptoms had a parent who reported being sad or depressed,
compared with 14% with no reactions and 26% with one to three reactions.
The most common child reaction 2 years post-9/11 remained concern about
safety, affecting 42% of the city’s children. All (100%) children with one or
more complaints reported having this concern as one of the multiple issues.
Children with concern about their own and their family’s safety were signifi-
cantly more likely to be fearful of another terrorist attack than those who
did not have this concern.
By the end of the 2003, a profile of children with the greatest need for mental
health intervention became apparent, with 67% of these children reported as
depressed, sad, or prone to crying, and 87% being distracted, anxious, or ner-
vous. Almost half (48%) showed regressive behavior, which included being
clingy and attention-seeking.
In terms of race and ethnicity, the highest rate of posttraumatic distress was
among Hispanic children, among whom 32% had multiple concerns and symp-
toms, compared with 22% of black children and 15% of white children. Poverty
was also a factor. Among families with incomes below $50,000, 28% of children
displayed multiple concerns and reactions compared with 17% among families
with income above $50,000. In New York’s poorest borough, the Bronx, 26%
of children had multiple concerns and symptoms and only 27% had no reac-
tions at all. In Manhattan, 15% had multiple concerns and symptoms while
nearly half (48%) had no post-9/11 reactions. These results are consistent
with findings that low income is a risk factor for posttraumatic stress reactions
following a disaster or terrorist attack [23,24].
Prior exposure to trauma emerged as a factor in post-9/11 reactions. One fourth
(25%) of children with multiple concerns and symptoms had experienced some
prior trauma, such as being a victim of or a witness to violent crime, or being
in a serious accident, compared with 18% of families of children with one to three
reactions and 16% of families of children with no reported reactions.
The key child symptom questions asked in New York City were then re-
peated with a representative national sample. The degree to which the psycho-
logical impact of a megadisaster is experienced nationwide is reflected in these
results 2 years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. About one child in five nation-
ally (21%) had increased concern about safety and was fearful of another ter-
rorist attack; 13% were reported to be demonstrating a qualitative increase
in regressive behavior; 12% anxiety; 9% somatic symptoms; and 5% depres-
sion and sadness. These children were evenly distributed among the regions
of the country. However, racial–ethnic and income disparities were marked.
Twenty-four percent of Hispanic children had multiple reactions, compared
with 12% black and 7% white. The percentage of children with multiple reac-
tions in families with incomes below $50,000 was 50% higher than in families
with incomes above $50,000 (12% versus 8% respectively).
Hurricane Katrina and the Gulf Coast. Before the hurricanes, Louisiana and Mis-
sissippi vied for the nation’s highest poverty rates, highest percentage of
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social and public health challenges suggest that the region was poorly posi-
tioned at a baseline to respond to a surge in acute medical and mental health
need, which was demonstrated in 2005.
Federal survey data from Katrina evacuees sheltered in San Antonio several
weeks after the hurricane found that 42% of evacuee households had at least
one member with a chronic health condition, 28% had at least one member
with a physical or mental disability, and 20% reported a current need for men-
tal health intervention for at least one member [27]. These high rates of chronic
conditions and mental health needs were subsequently corroborated in survey
research done by Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Pre-
paredness with families living in temporary FEMA-subsidized housing, typi-
cally mobile-home–style trailers. In common with earlier survey data of adult
Katrina evacuees in Houston [10], the families in FEMA housing in both Loui-
siana and Mississippi were disproportionately low-income and African-Ameri-
can. Abramson and Garfield [28,29] observed that low-income families making
<$10,000/y were the hardest hit economically by the hurricane, with 53% los-
ing all source of income (compared with 15% for families with income
>$20,000/y).
One year after Katrina, more than half of caregivers at relocation sites in
Mississippi reported that at least one of their children had new mental health
concerns that emerged after the hurricanes. This is an even higher rate than
was reported with similar methodology in FEMA relocation sites in Louisiana
6 months after the disaster, strongly suggesting that mental health issues after
a megadisaster continue to emerge over time. In Mississippi, the rate of diag-
nosed child depression and anxiety disorders nearly quadrupled. Reported be-
havior problems doubled. It is likely that the pattern of overcrowded,
occasionally dangerous, and transient living conditions that evacuees have
been subjected to has contributed to the emergence of ongoing psychological
problems [28].
In Mississippi, data following screening with a standardized instrument show
that adult mental health symptoms are endemic amongst evacuees [30]. Sixty
two percent of parents or caregivers reported symptoms of depression, anxiety,
and/or posttraumatic stress disorders. This exceeds the screening results for
Louisiana parents in FEMA shelters of >50%, again reinforcing evidence
that postdisaster mental health problems emerge over time. Thirteen percent
of parents reported that they were not able to cope day to day with the de-
mands of caring for a child, an eightfold increase compared with pre-Katrina
levels. Given the established degree to which parental coping mediates child re-
actions, this finding indicates an additional risk factor for problematic posttrau-
matic stress reactions in children.
Reports from school-based health centers throughout Louisiana indicate
a greatly increased need for mental health services in the schools following
Hurricane Katrina. Schools, especially those with a greater number or per-
centage of relocated students, reported relative increases in quarrels and
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(55%), disruptive behavior (43%), and sexual promiscuity (31%). School per-
sonnel, including mental health professionals, reported a greatly increased
need to provide case management and other concrete support services to
parents [31].
Unmet postdisaster mental health needs. FEMA reports that it made available the
highest level of funding (more than $150 million) for postdisaster crisis coun-
seling to New York following 9/11. Despite this, numerous sources indicate
that there was and continues to be a mismatch between those in need and
the services that could help them. A New York City study of the psychological
impact and services received by children after the terrorist attacks of September
11 reported that approximately 18% of children had severe or very severe post-
traumatic stress reactions, with only 27% of them receiving counseling or inter-
vention services [32].
One year after 9/11, only 13% of children in need had received mental
health intervention. It was again observed that those with the most severe post-
disaster responses (four or more post-9/11 reactions) were more likely to re-
ceive care. However, only 24% of these children received professional
intervention, leaving three fourths untreated or potentially receiving inade-
quate services. Particularly noteworthy was the asymmetric distribution of,
and access to, pediatric mental health resources. As noted previously, the
need was greatest in the city’s poorest borough, the Bronx, where only 9%
of children with multiple postdisaster reactions received mental health services
compared with 22% in Manhattan.
The disparity between federal funding and actual receipt of mental health ser-
vices by those in need is related in part to the narrow definition that the federal
government has adopted for the term ‘‘crisis counseling.’’ Restrictions on the al-
lowable use of federal crisis counseling funding have impeded the ability of com-
munities in New York and the Gulf Coast to rapidly ramp up their clinical mental
health services after a disaster. Instead, ‘‘crisis counseling’’ has frequently con-
sisted of simple mental health screening with little opportunity for necessary re-
ferral or follow-up, peer counseling, or the distribution of public service
announcements. These broad and shallow interventions fall short of reacting
to the acute need for true mental health services by patients with postdisaster de-
pression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress reactions. Children can become trap-
ped in this process and, as we have seen, in many cases go un- or under-treated. In
New York, data from the State Office of Mental Health show that 687,848 crisis
counseling sessions were provided to 465,428 individuals, an average of approx-
imately 1.5 sessions per user, most of whom were adults. These sessions were pro-
vided between September 2001 and December 2003 [33,34]. These data suggest
that aggressive, longitudinal mental health interventions for children were poorly
provided within the context of post-9/11 acute crisis counseling services. Addi-
tionally, most of the crisis counseling services funded with FEMA appropriations
to New York City were terminated in August 2003. This in part accounts for the
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services were terminated abruptly despite a documented ongoing need.
In recent years, evidence has been accumulating about the effectiveness of
interventions for children’s mental health disorders. Unfortunately, many
knowledge and practice gaps still remain. The literature is limited regarding
best-practice models and evidence-based treatments for poor, underserved, or
ethnic-minority children impacted by extensive trauma, exactly the demo-
graphic that suffered the most during Katrina. More information about pediat-
ric postdisaster symptomatology, as well as comorbidities, such as substance
abuse, nonaccidental injury, and suicide, need further exploration. Initial re-
search suggests that all may play a significant role in this environment.
Increasing the ability to recognize pediatric psychological problems should
be a priority, as should bolstering the training to pediatricians, family doctors,
mental health professionals, and other caregivers. There should be an empha-
sis on the importance of using traditional support systems, such as clergy, ex-
tended family, and community agencies, to supplement acute-care services.
First responders should be oriented to the possible mental health issues impact-
ing children postdisasters and become skilled in providing psychological first
aid to families during the initial stages of a disaster response. Psychological first
aid is a concept of promoting a sense of safety, calmness, connectedness, and
self-efficacy during the evolving stages of a disaster, while at the same time of-
fering assistance if it is needed. For those who will be monitoring children for
symptoms, it is important to have a better understanding and practice with dif-
ferential diagnosis in particular of such disorders as PTSD, depression, and
those associated with adjustment, anxiety, and mood. The unique needs of
children with preexisting mental health conditions also must be taken into ac-
count as they are the most vulnerable to subsequent problems and long-term
effects.
For the appropriate mental health care of children and families after a disas-
ter, a mechanism should be in place to provide for concrete needs, such as
housing, food, and clothing assistance, as well as rapid return to a sense of rou-
tine, including school. This must be accompanied by screening for all and
prompt aggressive therapy for mental health issues when indicated. Children
and adolescents need to feel safe, have significant support, and possess a sense
of hope and consistency to give them the best chance at recovering psycholog-
ically after a disaster. This has been a major shortfall in the Hurricane Katrina
recovery efforts. Many families with children—the estimates are 125,000—con-
tinue to live in isolated and crowded FEMA housing or trailer parks. Up to one
third of these children are suffering from a chronic illness, such as asthma, and
only 50% of those who previously had routine medical care still do. Truancy is
epidemic, and the quality of the education children are receiving is significantly
affected by overcrowding and a progressively unsafe learning environment
[28,29].
Fostering a culture of resilience is an important way to empower individuals
and families to recover their own lives after a disruption. In the postdisaster
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tural resources to handle adversity in a way that does not interfere with long-
term functioning. Enhanced self-esteem and generalized efficacy, improved com-
munication, better conflict mediation skills, and augmented capabilities in other
domains of cognitive problem-solving are related to increased resilience. These
can all be encouraged by engaging families and individuals in the disaster plan-
ning process at all levels, and by promoting the sense that they cannot depend en-
tirely upon a system that may not have the capacity to care for them in a time of
need.
On a policy level, it is essential that all disaster plans include extensive re-
sources for assessing and treating child mental health issues and concerns
and those of their caregivers. This should involve the integration and prioriti-
zation of psychosocial needs of children in the preparedness planning of
federal, state, and regional/local government agencies. Similarly, community-
based agencies with a mission to promote wellness, foster resilience, and
Box 5: Lessons learned: guidelines for pediatric mental health
services
Immediately after a disaster, pediatric mental health interventions should be prac-
tical and responsive to the concrete needs of children.
As soon as possible after a disaster, it is essential to create opportunities for chil-
dren to express their feelings and concerns, to establish an environment where
children feel safe, and to re-establish for children a sense of normalcy.
Providing psycho-education services and intervention where necessary to parents
and caregivers is an essential component of early-stage relief that can have
a significant impact on children.
Children obtain their sense of safety from adult cues. For children, a predictable
routine (eg, school) and a consistent support system is important.
Direct losses may result in the development of more serious symptomatology, es-
pecially for children with previous exposure to loss or tragedy, or for those with
preexisting mental illness.
Posttrauma symptoms often develop weeks or months after the ‘‘trigger’’ event.
Psychological problems may be inclusive or exclusive of PTSD. Such problems,
which include depression, interpersonal problems, regression, stress, and an
inability to trust and to feel safe and secure, may present right away or emerge
over time. They may also be long-lasting.
There is no ‘‘ground zero’’ for the psychological effects of a disaster: The distance
from the incident may not be directly related to the type or severity of
symptoms.
Exposure to repetitive images or reports of a disaster on television or in other me-
dia may exacerbate the psychological response of a child and should be lim-
ited. The child should have an opportunity to discuss the meaning of those
reports or images with an adult.
209CHILDREN AND MEGADISASTERSprepare families for disaster should be developed and funded. These agencies
can focus on encouraging self-efficacy, better communication, and effective
ways to involve all members of family in age, language, and culturally appro-
priate preparedness activities. Box 5 provides guidelines for pediatric mental
health services during and following a disaster. Box 6 summarizes findings re-
lated to pediatric disaster mental health systems
SUMMARY
Many specific lessons were learned from recent megadisasters in the United
States at the expense of children who suffered from a government and a citi-
zenry that was desperately unprepared to respond to and recover from the dis-
aster’s short- and long-term effects. During the 9/11 attacks, the nation learned
a new sense of vulnerability as the specter of terrorism was delivered repeat-
edly to our collective consciousness. As this article has emphasized, children
experienced significant and widespread psychological effects from this event,
and many did not receive adequate treatment. Hurricane Katrina exploited
the weaknesses of an already strained child mental health system and vividly
demonstrated the liability of poor preparedness and inadequate communica-
tion by both families and governments. The impact of Katrina continues to af-
fect many thousands of children over a year later, as the systems that were
intended to care for them have largely moved on. Indeed, there was no men-
tion of Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf Coast, or the storm’s survivors in the 2007
State of the Union address by the President.
After 9/11 and the unprecedented federal spending that occurred to increase
our nation’s readiness, it is discouraging that the response to Hurricane Katrina
fell so short of what had the potential to be the greatest disaster response and
recovery story in the history of our nation. It is unlikely that further
Box 6: Lessons learned: pediatric disaster mental health systems
Failure to provide adequate pediatric postdisaster mental health services when
needed may increase the number and severity of symptoms, such as PTSD
and depression.
Children in families with a low income as well as members of racial or ethnic mi-
nority populations are at a disproportionate risk for experiencing new and mul-
tiple psychological symptoms and/or behavior problems after a disaster.
After a disaster, the ability of a family with children to cope with the day-to-day
pressures of care may decrease significantly.
Many children in need of services in the postdisaster environment may not be re-
ceiving them. A high index of suspicion is prudent to monitor for depression or
stress-related symptoms.
After a disaster, there may be increased incidents of substance abuse, child mal-
treatment, suicidal ideation, and completed suicides.
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Gulf Coast. There is not a solution that money can buy. One need only
look a few hundred miles south to the Cuban disaster response system to ap-
preciate where some of our shortfalls lie. Cuba has succeeded where the United
States has not in part because its citizens are participants in their own prepared-
ness. They engage their children and their families in preparedness planning
and they rely upon other members of their community to strengthen their abil-
ity to survive as individuals. The American mentality of ‘‘dial 911 in an emer-
gency and wait for help’’ works only as long as there are enough resources to
match the need. In a disaster, this approach has proven to be inadequate over
and over again. In America, we are well positioned to be leaders in responding
to the needs of children affected by disaster. The resources of our government
and the resourcefulness of our people should offer much promise for the future.
By analyzing our past shortfalls and taking practical steps to mitigate the exist-
ing barriers to preparedness, our children, we hope, will fare much better the
next time a megadisaster strikes. Box 7 includes suggestions for national prior-
ities for child disaster care.
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Box 7: Lessons learned: national priorities for child disaster care
Encourage a national culture of preparedness that engages the public in taking
responsibility for some of its own care during a crisis. Draw from successful ex-
amples, such as the Cuban disaster readiness system, which teaches children
the fundamentals of preparedness and resilience and how to apply these skills.
A national disaster preparedness day to apply and evaluate response and re-
covery planning at all levels would send a strong message to families, commu-
nities, and businesses in the United States that this is time well spent.
Assure that the disaster planning agencies as well as the medical response and
sheltering systems in the United States are better informed and empowered
to address the special medical and psychological needs of children after
a disaster.
Encourage primary care providers for children, especially those with special
health care needs, to become involved in advocating for effective family disas-
ter preparedness.
Significant attention needs to be paid to the wide-reaching and long-lasting ef-
fects of disasters on the mental health of children. Recent research-based evi-
dence should drive major efforts to increase the availability of direct services
after a significant event. A special focus is needed for children identified to
be at the highest risk for debilitating psychological effects, such as those
who are members of racial or ethnic minority groups and those in poor
families.
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Form includes statement that document may be released with credit to the American College of
Emergency Physicians and the American Academy of Pediatrics.
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